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INTRODUCTION

HANGING times and political unrest often lead to reflection on
government and its structure. The Framers of the United States
Constitution, in describing the constitutional structure and basic
principles of our federal system, left us with two constitutional doctrines:
(1) separation of powers; and (2) nondelegation. The constitutional concept of separation of powers involves the division of power among three
* The author would like to thank Professor Harvey Wingo and Professor Linda S.
Eads for providing assistance in the preparation of this Comment.
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branches of government.1 James Madison affirmed this concept when he
stated that "the three great departments of power should be separate and
distinct."'2 The nondelegation doctrine, a corollary of the separation of
powers doctrine, prohibits any branch from giving away its power. 3 The
separation of powers doctrine prevents the accumulation of excessive
power in one branch; the nondelegation doctrine prevents one branch
from abdicating its authority to another. But total separation of each
branch was never envisioned. 4 The constitutional concept of checks and
balances provides for each branch to exercise oversight and control over
the other branches. 5 Separation of powers was never intended to mean
that each branch of government should not6 have partial agency in, or
control over, the acts of the other branches.
An analysis of these two constitutional doctrines reveals that they have
competing goals. When working as designed, both doctrines create a self-

enforcing system based on mutual respect and the pragmatic need for
comity among the branches. 7 The need for a cooperative and functional
system has grown with the complexity of the federal government and is
particularly acute with regard to the increasing importance of administrative agencies. 8 In balancing these doctrines, each branch of government
1. The Constitution of the United States divides power into three separate branches
of government: 1) "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 1, cl.1 (emphasis added). 2) "The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.1 (emphasis added). 3) "The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl.1 (emphasis added).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 139 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.
1981). Madison cautioned that "[tihe accumulation of all powers legislative, executive and
judiciary in the same hands,. . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."
Id.
3. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Both decisions invalidated federal statutes on nondelegation grounds.
4. See Buckley v.Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,120-24 (1976); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (noting that the "[Constitution] enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Id. (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
5. The checks and balances among the three branches of the federal government find
textual support in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.5 (oversight of the
executive branch by the legislative branch). Additional support for this checks and balances system can be found in the Framers' intent. See THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Roy P.
Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1981).
6. See Madison, supra note 2, at 140 (citing the political philosopher Montesquieu).
7. Id. No. 51, at 160. Madison asserted: "This policy of supplying by opposite and
rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of
human affairs ...." Id. (emphasis added).
8. President Roosevelt's New Deal brought with it increased expectations of the federal government. In order to accommodate these expectations, regulatory administrative
agencies, generally a part of the executive branch, have been given authority, often with
little guidance. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 413-14 (2d ed.
1991). This regulatory authority has grown exponentially since World War II and includes
legislative, executive, and judicial authority. One example of this concentration of power
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must be careful neither to abdicate its constitutionally assigned role nor
encroach on another branch's constitutionally assigned role.9
Keeping this limitation in mind, each branch must develop effective
policy tools that maintain the checks and balances intended by the Framers of the Constitution. Each branch of government has, over time, utilized tools that are not enumerated in the Constitution to exercise control
over or "check" other branches of government.' 0 These tools must be
carefully crafted to preserve the separation of powers between each
branch and to ensure no unconstitutional delegation of authority from
one branch to another."
This Comment reviews the constitutionality of one such tool-the leg-

islative veto. The next section reviews the history and development of
the legislative veto. The third section analyzes INS v. Chadha,12 a United
States Supreme Court decision holding legislative vetoes unconstitutional. The last section discusses the current debate surrounding the legislative veto and suggests a need for workable tools that check the
delegation of authority and separation of powers between the branches of

our government.
II.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LEGISLATIVE VETO

The legislative veto is a tool used by Congress to exercise oversight and
control over the executive branch while maintaining a balance of
power.13 Congress must retain oversight and control of the executive
within an administrative agency can be seen in the statutory delegation of authority to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. See infra notes 45-65 and accompanying text.

9. See Louis L.

JAFFE, JUDICIAL

CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

28-86

(1965) (discussing the relation between separation of powers and nondelegation doctrines).
10. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (the United States
Supreme Court vested itself with the authority to declare acts of Congress
unconstitutional).
11. Commentators have analogized the growth in size and importance of administrative agencies to a fourth branch of government. Arguably, this fourth branch is outside the
federal government structure envisioned by the Framers. Consequently, delegating lawmaking, law enforcing, and judicial authority to an administrative agency does not implicate separation of powers and nondelegation concerns voiced by the Framers. However,
for this Comment, it will be assumed that administrative agencies are a part of the executive branch, and as such implicates separation of powers and nondelegation issues.
12. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
13. "The types of legislative veto include: congressional disapproval by a one-house
vote; approval by a one-house vote; disapproval by a concurrent resolution of both houses;
approvalby a concurrent resolution of both houses; disapproval or approval by committee
action; and selective veto, approvingpart and disapprovingpart ....
" Douglas B. Habig,
Comment, The Constitutionality of the Legislative Veto, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 123, 12324 (1981) (emphasis added).
Use of the legislative veto allows Congress to delegate legislative authority while avoiding the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment for each legislative
decision. The bicameral requirement provides that all bills passed, as well as every order,
resolution, and vote, must involve both houses of Congress. Presentment requires that all
bills, orders, resolutions, and votes be presented to the President for approval. The Constitution explains these requirements: "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Repre-
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branch in situations where Congress has delegated a portion of its lawmaking authority. 14 Without such oversight and control, the balance of
powers would be altered.
The first legislative veto was initiated by President Herbert Hoover.
Hoover wanted Congress to delegate to the president the authority to

reorganize the executive branch, including various administrative activi-

ties, subject to congressional approval or disapproval. 15 Hoover first requested this veto in his 1929 Annual Message and again in his 1931
Annual Message to Congress. 16 He finally received the requested reorganization authority subject to a one-House legislative veto. 17 The delegated authority allowed President Hoover to submit an Executive Order

containing the proposed reorganization to Congress; the proposal was to
become effective unless either House
disapproved by simple resolution
18

within a designated time frame.
Based on this grant of authority, Hoover issued eleven Executive Orders consolidating approximately fifty-eight activities. 19 The House of
Representatives vetoed all of these Executive Orders, deciding to leave
20
organizational changes to the newly-elected Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Hoover, in an apparent about-face, then vetoed a bill requiring joint approval by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation for refunds
or credits in excess of $20,000 on the grounds that Congress should not be

involved in executive or administrative functions.21 In support of this
Mitchell's conclunew position, Hoover cited Attorney General William
22
sion that the legislative veto was unconstitutional.

sentatives." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. "Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; ...." U.S. CONST.art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of
Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and
before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of
Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the
Case of a Bill.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl.
3.
14. This situation is often a political trade where Congress agrees to delegate a portion
of its lawmaking authority if the Executive is willing to delegate a portion of its administrative or law enforcing authority. The Executive's willingness to support this "trade" is recognized when the president does not veto enactment of the legislation that includes a
legislative veto provision.
15. Louis FISHER & NEAL DEVINS, POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
123-24 (1992). This delegation of power, subject to legislative approval or disapproval
("veto"), reversed the roles of Congress and the president as defined in the Constitution.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7, cls. 2, 3.
16. FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 15, at 123-24.
17. Id. at 124.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. .ewis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 273, 276 (Autumn 1993).
22. 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 56, 65 (1933). Attorney General Mitchell's opinion spoke directly to the separation of powers issue lurking within the legislative veto:
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President Roosevelt, like President Hoover, had a mixed record of sup-

port regarding the legislative veto.23 Despite uncertainties about the constitutionality of the device, Roosevelt understood that Congress would

not delegate certain authority without this reservation of power.24 He

conceded that the legislative veto presented a check on executive power,
but felt it was a necessary cost of increased delegation of legislative

power to the executive branch. But, in an attempt to preserve his constitutional objections, President Roosevelt articulated them in a memorandum to his attorney general, Robert H. Jackson. 25

Regulatory administrative agencies within the executive branch began
a pattern of steady growth after the 1930s, prompting greater use of the
legislative veto.26 During the 1940s, legislative veto provisions appeared

in reorganization acts, immigration acts, and defense appropriations. 27
Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower signed bills containing legislative vetoes. 28 President Truman, however, later made it
clear that he considered the legislative veto unconstitutional. His administration reported that the legislative veto was contrary to the fundamental constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and would frustrate
proper administration of legal rights. 29
President Eisenhower also voiced constitutional objections to the legislative veto. In response to President Eisenhower's concerns, and in hopes

of curbing the use of the legislative veto, Attorney General Brownell issued an opinion opposing the congressional committee veto as unconstitutional. 30 Despite the fact that this opinion had little effect on the use of
The Constitution of the United States divides the functions of the Government into three great departments-the legislative, the executive, and the
judicial-and establishes the principle that they shall be kept separate, and
that neither the legislative, executive, nor judicial branch may exercise functions belonging to the others .... [The legislative veto] attempts to entrust
to members of the legislative branch, acting ex officio, executive functions in
the execution of the law, and it attempts to give to a committee of the legislative branch power to approve or disapprove executive acts.
Id at 58.
23. FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 15, at 125; see also 83 CONG. REC. 4981, 5004-11
(1938) (debating the constitutionality of Congress's power to exercise the legislative veto).
24. FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 15, at 125.
25. This memorandum was later published. Robert H. Jackson, A PresidentialLegal
Opinion, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1353 (1953) (arguing that the legislative veto is unconstitutional because it fails to meet constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment).
26. See, e.g., John B. Henry II, The Legislative Veto: In Search of ConstitutionalLimits,
16 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 735, 737-38 n.7 (1979) (collecting citations to presidential statements); H. Lee Watson, Comment, Congress Steps Out: A Look at CongressionalControl
of the Executive, 63 CAL. L. REV. 983, 1089-94 apps. A & B (1975) (compilation of legislative veto provisions);.
27. Fisher, supra note 21, at 277.
28. FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 15, at 126.

29. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE
SHALL WELCOME 213-14 (1953). No assertion was made that the delegation to the executive, vesting lawmaking authority in administrative agencies, was contrary to separation of
powers; only the legislative veto, was challenged as unconstitutional. Id.
30. 41 Op. Att'y Gen. 230, 231 (1955). The opinion states:
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the legislative veto, the President continued to object to provisions giving
Congress control over administrative decisions as constitutionally
31
unacceptable.
In the 1970s the legislative veto was included in statutes involving the

"war powers, national emergencies, impoundment, presidential papers,
federal salaries, and selected agency regulations. '32 Congress used the
legislative veto with increasing frequency in an effort to control the ever
increasing promulgation of regulations by government agencies. At the
same time, presidents continued to approve legislation containing legislative vetoes, while calling into question the vetoe's constitutionality. 33

An example of this dual executive branch position can be seen in the

1977 opinion of President Carter's attorney general, Griffin Bell. 34 The

opinion supported a one-House veto in a particular reorganization statute 35 while refusing to give support to other statutory legislative vetoes. 36
Attorney General Bell explained:
[I]f the procedures provided in a given statute have no effect on the

constitutional distribution of power between the legislative and the
executive-that is, the power of presidential veto is effectively pre-

served and the principle of bicameralism is respected-the fact that
the procedure is not explicitly authorized by the language of Article I
is not enough to render the statute unconstitutional. 37
But Attorney General Bell was quick to distinguish the "reorganization"
statute under review from "statutes which provide for subsequent resolu-

tions disapproving presidential actions in the administration of continuing
38
programs."
[The legislative veto] engrafts executive functions upon legislative members
and thus overreaches the permitted sweep of legislative authority. At the
same time, it serves to usurp power confided to the executive branch. The
result, therefore, is violative of the fundamental constitutional principle of
separation of powers prescribed in Articles I and II of the Constitution which
places the legislative power in the Congress and the executive power in the
executive branch.
Id.
31. See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1956, Pub. L. No. 157, 69
Stat. 301, 321 (1955) (requiring Senate and House approval prior to spending Department
of Defense appropriations).
32. Fisher, supra note 21, at 284.
33. See supra notes 15-32 and accompanying text. This pattern of action makes clear
that the executive branch wanted the delegation of authority from Congress but did not
want Congress to exercise control over or administer the authority.
34. Reorganization Act-Constitutionality of Provision Permitting Disapproval of
Reorganization Plan by Resolution of a Single House of Congress, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No.
10 (Jan. 31, 1977) [hereinafter Reorganization Act].
35. 5 U.S.C. § 906(a) (1976).
36. Reorganization Act, supra note 34, at 2-4. Attorney General Bell stated, "I should
emphasize at the outset that my opinion is limited to this particular statute ... and is to be
taken in no manner as approving the constitutionality of the procedure of congressional
disapproval of executive action by resolution in other statutes." Id. at 2.
37. Id. at 3.
38. Id. at 4. This position challenges the legislative veto in isolation without considering the reality that "resolutions disapproving presidential actions in the administration of
continuing programs" is coupled with a delegation of authority from Congress to the executive. Id. But for the delegation of authority there would be no "presidential actions."
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President Carter challenged the legislative veto in all areas except
those related to reorganization. 39 President Carter, following President
Eisenhower's lead, declared that legislative veto provisions would be
treated as "report-and-wait" provisions. 40 The report-and-wait provisions would require the Executive to report to Congress, wait for a re-

sponse, and then act as the Executive believed appropriate. The exercise
of any legislative veto would be considered congressional disapproval and
would be given "serious consideration [by executive officials] ...[but the
'4 1
legislative veto would not be regarded as] legally binding."

While President Carter was taking this hard-line approach, others in his
administration took more pragmatic positions. 42 Attorney General Griffin Bell and White House aide Stuart Eizenstat announced in a White
House press release that certain types of legislative vetoes were acceptable.43 Bell and Eizenstat were not willing to concede that a legislative
veto might be constitutional; however, both agreed acceptance of the legislative veto was based on a spirit of courtesy and respect between coequal branches of government."4 The Carter administration's position ultimately resulted in a constitutional challenge to the legislative veto
45
which culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. Chadha.

III. INS V. CHADHA
The Supreme Court dealt directly with the constitutional issues
presented by the legislative veto in INS v. Chadha.4 6 To appreciate the
constitutional dimensions of this decision, the legal history of the case

must be examined. 47 Chadha and its various opinions lay out the arguments both for and against the constitutionality of the legislative veto.
39. Id.
40. Legislative Vetoes: Message to Congress, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1146, 1149 (June 21,
1978).
41. Id. President Carter stated his opposition to the legislative veto in no uncertain
terms:
Such intrusive devices infringe on the Executive's constitutional duty to
faithfully execute the laws. They also authorize Congressional action that
has the effect of legislation while denying the President the opportunity to
exercise his veto. Legislative vetoes thereby circumvent the President's role
in the legislative process established by Article I, Section 7 of the
Constitution.
Id. at 1147.
42. This is consistent with a statement by Louis Fisher, who maintains "[it is superficial to think that the legislative veto merely represents an attempt by Congress to encroach
on executive responsibilities. The legislative veto originated because presidents wanted it."
Fisher, supra note 21, at 275.
43. Id. at 285, citing Office of the White House Secretary, press release, June 21, 1978,
at 1-4 (stating that legislative vetoes in the War Powers Resolution are acceptable).
44. Office of the White House Secretary, press release, June 21, 1978, at 1-4.
45. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
46. Id.
47. Chadha touches all three branches of government because it is based on an administrative adjudication within the executive branch that was originally empowered by a congressional grant of authority limited by a legislative veto and ultimately appealed to the
Supreme Court.
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This section begins with Chadha's deportation proceedings leading to the
congressional exercise of a statutory legislative veto and follows the case
from the Board of Immigration Appeals to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals and ultimately to the Supreme Court, which declared legislative
vetoes unconstitutional.

It is necessary to understand the statutory delegations of duties made

by Congress before analyzing Chadha.4 8 Without this background,
neither the separation of powers challenge, which is the primary focus of
Chadha, nor the lack of consideration given the nondelegation doctrine

can be fully appreciated. The Alien Registration Act of 1940 (the Act)
authorized the attorney general, a member of the executive branch, to
suspend deportation proceedings in certain hardship cases. 49 The Act required the attorney general to report each suspension to Congress, which

reserved the right to exercise a two-House legislative veto.50 In 1952
Congress replaced the Act with the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA). 51 INA section 244(c)(2) substituted the 1940 two-House legisla-

52
tive veto for a one-House legislative veto.
54
The INA entitles an alien 53 to a hearing to determine deportability.
During this hearing, conducted by an administrative law judge (ALU), the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) must prove the grounds
for deportability listed in an order to show cause. 55 An alien may apply

for suspension of deportation.5 6 Upon completion of the necessary

forms, the ALJ conducts a hearing and receives evidence on the issues of
grounds for deportability and for suspension.5 7 For a favorable grant of

48. When considering the statutory duties imposed by Congress it must be
remembered that the Supreme Court has established that Article I, by vesting legislative
power in Congress, imposed constraints on the legislature's authority to delegate that
power to others. The Supreme Court stated that the applicable test was whether Congress
has laid "down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to take action is directed to conform." J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
49. Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670 (1940).
50. The two-House legislative veto reserved Congress the right to disapprove suspension by a vote from both the House of Representatives and the Senate.
51. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1994)).
52. The new one-House veto allowed either house acting alone to override the attorney general's suspension of deportation. Questions arise regarding whether this violates
the bicameralism requirements of U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 1, 7, cls. 2, 3.
53. An alien is "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(3) (1994). An alien may have either legal or illegal status.
54. INA § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1994).
55. Id. An administrative law judge is an officer or employee of the INS vested with
the power delegated to the attorney general to administer and enforce the INA. 8 C.F.R.
§ 2.1 (1995) (authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1988)).
56. INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994); 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(a) (1995). The ALJ has
been delegated the power to consider applications for suspension, subject to review by the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1995).
57. 8 C.F.R. § 244.1 (1995).

1996]

LEGISLATIVE VETO

suspension, the alien must first meet the statutory prerequisites, 58 and
then the ALJ must exercise favorable discretion.
If the ALJ denies suspension, section 106(a) permits the alien to seek
review of the administrative order.59 Since deportation proceedings deal
with the liberty of a person, an initial review by an appellate court is

permitted. 60 The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) performs the initial review. 6 1 If the alien finds no relief from the BIA, the alien may then

seek relief in the federal circuit court in his venue, and ultimately, the
United States Supreme Court. 62
If the ALJ grants suspension, the attorney general can adjust the

alien's status to that of "an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. ' 63 At this point, the alien has one final obstacle to overcomethe one-House legislative veto. Congress activates this disapproval mechanism when reports of favorable action in suspension cases are received
from the attorney general. 64 Congress may choose to take action anytime

during the current session until close of the following session. The reports generally are sent to the Judiciary Committees of each House. By
agreement between the committees, all suspension cases are first considered by the Senate Judiciary Committee, and if approved, are then con65
sidered by the House Judiciary Committee.

A.

DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS

66

1. Order to Show Cause
Chadha, an East Indian born in Kenya, held a British passport and
entered the United States in 1966 on a nonimmigrant student visa which
expired on June 30, 1972.67 The INS issued an order to show cause why
58. These prerequisites require a period of residence in the United States, good moral
character, and hardship. See INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994).
59. Letter of Apr. 18, 1961 from B. White, Dep. Att'y Gen., to House Comm. on the
Judiciary, reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2968.
60. H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N
2972.
61. The BIA and the INS are distinct agencies; the BIA is in the Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.1-3.8 (1995).
62. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § l105a (1994). Section 106(a) states that a petition for
review in the court of appeals "shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for, the judicial
review of all final orders of deportation ... made against aliens within the United States
pursuant to administrative proceedings under section 1252(b) of this title." Id.
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994).
64. INA § 244(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1254(c)(1) (repealed 1988). The report should contain
"acomplete and detailed statement of the facts and pertinent provisions of law in the case
...with

the reasons for such suspension." Id

65. Attorneys representing suspended clients are usually given an opportunity to present the alien's story and submit new oral or written evidence, accompanied by documentary proof, and may discuss their case with the staff of the committee.
66. The decisions of the AI were not reported but were included as appendices to
the Jurisdictional Statement, INS v. Chadha, No. 80-1832, app. B, 64a-66a & app. D, 70a71a (May 1, 1981).
67. Jurisdictional Statement, INS v. Chadha, No. 80-1832, app. B (May 1, 1981).
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Chadha should not be deported. 68 During initial deportation proceedings
69
Chadha admitted his illegal status and the AJ found him deportable.
Chadha applied for suspension of deportation under the provisions of
70
section 244(a)(1).
2. Grant of Relief
The AUJ found that Chadha met the statutory requirements for relief
of suspension. 7 1 The ALJ exercised a favorable grant of discretion based
on the finding of "extreme hardship" because "it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for [Chadha] to return to Kenya or go to Great
Britain by reason of his racial derivation. 72 The ALJ granted Chadha's
suspension application and ordered his deportation be suspended. 73 The
ALJ forwarded a report of Chadha's suspension to Congress under section 244(c)(1). 74 The ALJ's order provided for Chadha's status to be adjusted to lawful permanent resident if Congress took no action adverse to
the order. 7" Chadha's deportation proceedings would be reopened if
Congress vetoed the order. 76
3. Exercise of Legislative Veto
The Senate Judiciary Committee approved the attorney general's suspension by not exercising its veto power. The House Judiciary Committee then considered the attorney general's decision. Representative
Eilberg introduced a resolution disapproving the "granting of permanent
residence" to Chadha on December 12, 1975. 77 The House Judiciary
Committee discharged the resolution from further consideration on December 16, 1975.78 Prior to discharge, Representative Wylie noted that
the resolution had not been printed or made available to the Members of
the House. 79 Representative Eilberg explained that if the resolution was
68. Id. The order to show cause charged Chadha in violation of INA § 241(a)(2) for
overstaying his visa. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.

71.
States,
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. Required statutory prerequisites include a period of residence in the United
good moral character, and hardship. See INA § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1994).
Jurisdictional Statement, INS v. Chadha, No. 80-1832, app. B, 66a (May 1, 1981).
Id. at app. B, 64a-66a.
INA § 244(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(1) (repealed 1988).
Jurisdictional Statement, INS v. Chadha, No. 80-1832, app. B (May 1, 1981).

76. Id.

77. H.R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 40,247 (1975). The resolution
said, in pertinent part, "the House of Representatives does not approve the granting of
permanent residence in the United States to the aliens hereinafter named, in which cases
the Attorney General has submitted reports to the Congress pursuant to section 244(a)(1)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended." H.R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 40,800 (1975).
78. 121 CONG. REc. 40,800 (1975).
79. Id. Normally the House would have distributed the resolution before acting on it.
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not passed during the current session,8 0 the aliens named would automatically be granted permanent residence.8 1 Representative Eilberg stated
the House Judiciary Committee supported the resolution reversing the
attorney general's grant of suspension because the aliens contained in the
resolution did not meet the statutory requirements of hardship.8 2 Without further debate or recorded vote, the committee passed the resolution. 83 The House Judiciary Committee used the one-House legislative
veto to reverse the administrative, and tacitly the Executive, grant of
84
suspension.
4. Denial of Relief
Following the legislative veto of Chadha's suspension, the AL reopened his deportation proceedings. 8 5 Chadha then asserted that section
244(c)(2), providing for a one-House legislative veto, was unconstitutional because "it is in contravention to Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution" in that it violates the separation of powers doctrine. 86 The ALJ,
having no authority to rule on the constitutionality of an Act of Congress,
ordered Chadha deported to the United Kingdom. 8 7 However, the ALJ
noted in his decision that it appeared Chadha had "a point. 8 8 The ALJ
also noted that a successful constitutional challenge might "[extinguish]
the right of suspension of deportation under any and all circumstances."8 9
B.

APPEAL TO BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS9 0

Chadha appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), asserting that section 244(c)(2) was unconstitutional "in that it provide[d] for
legislation inconsistent with and in contravention of Article I, Section 7 of
the United States Constitution and [was] violative of the separation of
powers [sic] doctrine contained in Article I, Section 6 of the United States
Constitution." 91 The BIA concluded that it had "no power to declare
80. This session of Congress ended December 19, 1975. 121 CONG. REC. 42,014,
42,277 (1975).
81. 121 CONG. REc. 40,800 (1975).

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Proponents of the legislative veto argue that the Executive was not reversed, but

rather Congress merely refused to support an executive proposal.
85. Jurisdictional Statement, INS v. Chadha, No. 80-1832, app. D, 70a-71a (May 1,
1981).
86. Transcript of Hearing in Deportation Proceedings Held on August 4, 1976, Before
Chester Sipkin, Immigration Judge, reprinted in Joint Appendix, INS v. Chadha, Nos. 801832, 80-2170, 80-2171 (Nov. 19, 1981) [hereinafter Transcript]. Chadha's original constitutional challenge appeared to rest on the failure of Congress, through use of the legislative
veto, to comply with bicameralism and presentment clauses within the Constitution.
87. Jurisdictional Statement, INS v. Chadha, No. 80-1832, app. D (May 1, 1981).
88. Id.
89. Transcript, supra note 86.
90. The decision of the BIA was not recorded but can be found in the Jurisdictional
Statement, INS. v. Chadha, No. 80-1832, app. E, 72a-73a (May 1, 1981).
91. Notice of Appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, Immigration and Naturalization Service, reprintedin Joint Appendix, INS v. Chadha, Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, 80-2171
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unconstitutional an act of Congress" and dismissed Chadha's appeal.92
The BIA, in its decision, commented that Chadha's constitutional claim
was "without merit. '93 The BIA, quoting its decision in Matter of
Santana, stated that "Congress has the absolute and unqualified power to
prescribe the conditions under which an alien may enter the United

States." 94

C.

APPEAL TO NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

After Chadha's unsuccessful appeal to the BIA, he petitioned the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for relief.95 Chadha again asserted that
the one-House legislative veto provision in section 244(c)(2) 96 was unconstitutional. The INS agreed that the legislative veto was unconstitutional
and the Ninth Circuit requested amici curiae briefs from the House of
Representatives and the Senate in support of the constitutionality of the
legislative veto. 97
1.

Jurisdictionand Justiciability

Congress, before reaching the merits of the case, challenged the Ninth
Circuit's jurisdiction and the justiciability of the case. 98 The Ninth Circuit

rejected Congress's contention that the controversy became moot when

Chadha married an American citizen. 99 The Ninth Circuit found jurisdic-

tion pursuant to INA section 106(a). 100 The Ninth Circuit addressed each
of Congress's three points individually: (1) Chadha lacked standing; (2)

the case presented a political question; and (3) the case lacked requisite

adverseness.10 1
Congress claimed Chadha lacked standing because he had suffered no

injury in fact, was asserting a generalized government grievance, and was

impermissibly asserting the rights of others.' 0 2 Congress's argument that
(Nov. 19, 1981). The reference to Article I, Section 6, of the Constitution appears to expand Chadha's constitutional challenge to assert that Congress, in exercising the section
244(c)(2) legislative veto, somehow appoints itself to an "Office under the Authority of the
United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
92. Jurisdictional Statement, INS v. Chadha, No. 80-1832, app. E (May 1, 1981).
93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Matter of Santana, 13 I&N Dec. 362, 364 (BIA 1969)).
95. This petition was made pursuant to INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1994).
96. INA § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (repealed 1988).
97. Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 418 n.6. Congress based this argument on the premise that Chadha's claim
was moot because he was eligible for permanent residency based on his marriage to an
American citizen. INA §§ 201, 204, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151, 1154 (1994).
100. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1994). Congress argued that the court lacked
jurisdiction because Chadha's challenge of the one-House veto was not a challenge to a
"final order" pursuant to "administrative proceedings." Chadha, 634 F.2d at 412. The
court reasoned that to adopt this construction of section 106 would contravene legislative
history and require the constitutionality of the INA never be challenged. Id. at 414-15. See
also 107 CONG. REc. 12,176 (1961) (remarks of Rep. Walters); H. REP. No. 565, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3,13 (1961) reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 731.
101. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 415.
102. Id.
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Chadha suffered no injury in fact was based on the premise that section
244(c)(2) was a non-severable portion of section 244. If the court invalidated section 244, Chadha would be deportable because there would be
no authority for the Executive's grant of suspension. 10 3 This argument
led Congress to conclude that Chadha was deportable regardless of the
court's decision and therefore suffered no injury in fact.' 0 4 The Ninth
Circuit disagreed with Congress's basic premise that section 244(c)(2) was
05
not severable.'
The Ninth Circuit relied on the severability clause of section 406 of the
INA and the proposition that section 244(a) operated independently of
section 244(c)(2) to reject Congress's position.' 0 6 Section 406 states that
"[i]f any particular provisions of this Act, or the application thereof to
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the Act and
the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall
not be affected thereby."'10 7 Additionally, section 244(a) gives the attorney general power to adjust the status of an alien; subsections (b) through
(f) merely restrict this power. 0 8 Therefore, section 244(a) operates independently, giving section 244(c)(2) a non-essential character. 0 9
The court concluded that Chadha had suffered injury in fact."10 The
Ninth Circuit, citing Buckley v. Valeo,"' stated that "parties with sufficient concrete interests at stake have been held to have standing to raise
constitutional questions of separation of powers with respect to an agency
designated to adjudicate their rights. 11 2 The Ninth Circuit found
Chadha to have "sufficient interests at stake" because if it invalidated
section 244(c)(2) his original suspension under section 244(a) would be
reinstated."13 Additionally, the court found that Chadha had alleged an
Article III case or controversy because he demonstrated "injury in fact"
and a substantial likelihood that "the judicial relief requested will prevent
or redress the claimed injury ....
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 415-17.
106. It
107. INA, § 406, 66 Stat. at 163 (1952). The court explained that a severability clause
provides a presumption of severability. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 415 (citing Electric Bond &
Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419, 434 (1938)). The court further explained that because
Congress sought to establish inseverability it must bear the burden of demonstrating that
"[Congress] would not have enacted those provisions within its power" without section
244(c)(2). Chadha, 634 F.2d at 415-16 (citing Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation
Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)). For a discussion of the general principle of severability, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 108 (1976) (per curiam).
108. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 416-17.
109. Id
110. Id.at 417.
111. 424 U.S. 1, 12 n.10 (1976) (per curiam).
112. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 415.
113. Id. at 417-18.
114. Id. at 418 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79
(1978)).
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The Ninth Circuit used its finding of Chadha's injury in fact to dismiss
Congress' argument that Chadha was asserting a generalized government
grievance. 115 The court explained that Chadha's challenge of section

244(c)(2) to redress his injury was specific and concrete and, in a separation of powers claim, sufficient for standing purposes. 1 6 Similarly, Congress's argument that Chadha was asserting the rights of the executive
and judicial branches and not his own failed because Chadha established

standing. 1 7 The Ninth Circuit held that any benefit gained by the executive or judicial branch was ancillary to Chadha's claim.
Congress, invoking the political question doctrine, 118 then argued that
the court should refuse to decide Chadha's claim because any decision
would be an encroachment on legislative powers. 119 Congress based this
assertion on the constitutional power it held over aliens under the Natu-

ralization Clause,' 20 when read in conjunction with the Necessary and

Proper Clause.' 2 ' The Ninth Circuit recognized that the political ques-

tion doctrine was implicated when the source of a claimant's appeal was
textually committed to another branch of government, thereby invoking
the principle of separation of powers.' 2 2 However, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Chadha's claim did not arise from either the Naturalization
or the Necessary and Proper Clauses; Chadha's claim was that section

244(c)(2) violated the separation of powers doctrine.' 2 3 Since the Constitution does not textually commit the separation of powers doctrine to any
one branch of government, no political question problem existed within
this case.
Next, Congress asserted that the case lacked requisite adverseness because the parties below, Chadha and the INS, had agreed that section
244(c)(2) was unconstitutional.' 2 4 The Ninth Circuit found this argument
unpersuasive. Relying on Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth,'25 the
115.
116.
117.
118.
courts

Id.
Id.
Chadha, 634 F.2d at 418.
The "political question doctrine holds that certain issues should not be decided by
"
because their resolution is committed to another branch of government ....

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY

1158-59 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pah-

lavi, 455 N.Y.S.2d 987, 990 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)).
119. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 419.
120. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
121. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
122. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 419; see Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1973) (political
question doctrine based on judicial recognition of separation of powers); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-20 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (no political
question when the doctrine in dispute is not textually committed to any one branch of
government).
123. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 419. In looking at section 244(c)(2) in isolation, the Ninth
Circuit fails to recognize two underlying principles: (1) Congress is not permitted to abdicate or transfer to others the essential legislative function with which it is vested (see
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)); and (2) the original
grant of authority under the INA was made pursuant to the Naturalization Clause. U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
124. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 419.
125. 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).
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Ninth Circuit explained that a controversy "must be a real and substantial
[one] admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts.' 26 If the court ruled for Chadha, he
would not be deported; if the court found section 244(c)(2) constitutional,
the INS would deport Chadha- even if it disagreed with the court's findings. 127 The Chadha case was sufficiently adverse and the Ninth Circuit
decision would have real meaning.
2.

ConstitutionalMerits: The Legislative Veto as a JudicialAct

After dismissing Congress's questions regarding jurisdiction and justiciability, the Ninth Circuit reached the merits of the case: whether section 244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers
by permitting Congress, acting pursuant to a legislative veto, to intrude
upon the executive and judicial branches. The case was one of first impression. Congress had never been found in derogation of the separation
of powers doctrine absent a showing of textual support within the Consti8
tution clearly conferring powers on another branch of government. 12
2
9
The 1976 Supreme Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo' had been the last
time the Court found a legislative action violated the separation of pow130
ers doctrine.
The Ninth Circuit recognized that the separation of powers doctrine
was designed as a self-enforcing rule.1 3' The court, however, considered
it a duty "to resolve disputes with or among the other component parts of
1 32
the Government" when violation of this self-enforcing rule occurred.
To meet this obligation in a case of first impression, the Ninth Circuit set
the standard of review for defining a constitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine.' 33 Relying on Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,134 the court defined a violation as "an assumption by one
branch of powers that are central or essential to the operation of a coordinate branch, provided also that the assumption disrupts the coordinate
branch in the performance of its duties and is unnecessary to implement a
legitimate policy of the Government.' 35
Analyzing the separation of powers issues, the Ninth Circuit considered three different views of the legislative veto: (1) "as a correction of
126. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 419.

127. Id.
128. Id. at 420. This may explain why Chadha cited Article I, Sections 6 and 7 of the
Constitution as textual support for his separation of powers challenge.
129. 424 U.S. 1, 118-24 (1976) (per curiam).
130. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 420-21 (decision based on a textual showing of support within
the Constitution).
131. Id. at 422.
132. Id. (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
133. Id. at 425.

134. 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
135. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 425.
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judicial or executive misapplication of the statute;" (2) "as a means for
[Congress to share] the administration of the statute with the Executive;"
and (3) "as the exercise of a residual legislative power to define substantive rights under the law[-but] falling short of statutory [action] which
1' 36
would... require formal constitutional procedures for legislation.'
The Ninth Circuit, focusing on the judicial nature of the congressional
proceedings, held that the legislative veto was a corrective device used to
review misapplication of the statute by other branches. 137 It was the judiciary's responsibility, at the conclusion of administrative proceedings, to
determine if the executive branch had correctly applied the statute that
established executive authority. 13 8 Congress assumed a judicial role
when it exercised a legislative veto. 139 The Ninth Circuit held that this
supervening legislative veto resulted in a de facto revision of any preceding judicial branch opinion, causing a disruptive and unnecessary interference with a central function of the judicial branch. 140 Section 244(c)(2)
judgment
allows Congress to reserve to itself the power to determine if its141
branch.
judicial
the
of
judgment
the
for
substituted
be
should
According to the court, Congress's use of the legislative veto converts
judicial decisions into mere advisory opinions. 142 Further, the legislative
veto has the potential to nullify judicial attempts to require uniform application of the statute by the executive branch. 43 Finally, the legislative
veto disrupts the relationship between the judicial branch and Congress:
the integrity of the judicial branch is undermined when its decisions may
be subjected to congressional review. 44
Congress argued that the legislative veto was not a corrective device
but rather served the sole purpose of allowing it to share in the administration of the statute. 145 Section 244(c)(2) allowed Congress, through use
of the legislative veto, to supplement the executive branch's implementation of the statute. 146 The Ninth Circuit turned this argument against
136. Id. at 429.
137. Id. at 429-30. The Ninth Circuit premised this argument on the foundation that a
legislative veto or "review" judges the actions of the executive branch. Id This position
fails to recognize that Chadha's appeal was based on separation of powers issues relating to
bicameralism and presentment, not judicial review.
138. Id. at 430.
139. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 430.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 430-31.
142. Id. at 430 (e.g., an ALJ exercises negative discretion and the alien appeals to an
Article III judge who reverses the AL, granting suspension; the legislative veto has the
potential to overturn this judicial decision).
143. Id. at 431 (e.g., the executive, knowing that judicial opinions are merely advisory,
will not be compelled to interpret the law in conformity with them, increasing the potential
that the law will not be uniformly applied).
144. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 430.

145. Id. Congress premised this argument on the foundation that a legislative veto or
"review" supplements the actions of the executive branch. Id. The Ninth Circuit's premise
is more closely aligned to the plain meaning of the word "review." See BLACK'S LAW
DICrIONARY 1320 (6th ed. 1990).
146. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 431.
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Congress, and determined that by "supplementing" the executive
branch's implementation or administration of the statute Congress as147
sumed a law enforcement role.
The Ninth Circuit held that Congress's gratuitous supplementing of the
executive branch's implementation is "disruptive and unnecessary to the
sound administration of the law."'1 48 Congress erodes the executive
branch's authority through the legislative veto by setting aside the executive branch's law enforcement decisions. 14 9 Moreover, the legislative
veto undermined executive branch authority exercised under a legal standard, subject to judicial review-further damaging the executive branch's
credibility with the judicial branch.' 5 0 Finally, the legislative veto disrupted the relationship between the executive branch and Congress, detracting from the executive branch's authority.' 5'
The Ninth Circuit did not reach the third issue, whether the legislative
veto could be viewed as the exercise of a residual legislative power to
define substantive rights under the law, concluding instead, that the issue
in this case was a separation of powers violation. 152 In dicta, however,
the Ninth Circuit did address the contentions of the parties as to whether
the legislative veto was constitutional by reason of its unicameral
53
character.
The Ninth Circuit concluded "[section 244(c)(2)] violates the constitutional doctrine of separation because it is a prohibited legislative intrusion upon the Executive and Judicial branches."'1 54 The court held the
legislative veto violates the separation of powers doctrine because it allowed one House of Congress to reverse a reasoned decision by the Executive on an individual case.' 55 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[b]y
assuming the task of correcting misapplications of the law, Congress [is]
performing a role ordinarily a judicial or an internal administrative
responsibility. "156
D.

APPEAL TO UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

157

The INS, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252, filed a notice of appeal to the
United States Supreme Court seeking relief from the Ninth Circuit's deci147. Id

148. Id at 432. Not addressed is whether, absent the legislative veto, the statute allows
the executive to "supplement" Congress's lawmaking authority.
149. Id.
150. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 432.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 433.
153. Id at 433-34. But see Jurisdictional Statement, INS v. Chadha, No. 80-1832 (May
1, 1981) (stating that the Ninth Circuit "held that the one-House veto provision in Section
244(c)(2) of the Act contravenes the procedural requirements [of bicameralism] in Article
I of the Constitution for the exercise of legislative power ... .") (emphasis added).
154. Chadha, 634 F.2d at 420.
155. Id. at 435-36.
156. Id. at 430.
157. The Supreme Court has issued several opinions styled "INS v. Chadha." Each of
these opinions, though generally procedural, are mentioned prior to discussion of the

418
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sion.158 After many procedural maneuvers and oral argument, the
Supreme Court issued a decision. 159 The final decision incorporated four

separate opinions.

60

The majority opinion is comprised of five struc-

61
tural parts; Justice White's dissent substantially parallels this structure.'
The structure of these opinions provides a road map by which to analyze
the constitutional dimensions of the legislative veto. Where the Court

restated the Ninth Circuit arguments, it will only be noted. After exhausting the constitutional arguments in these opinions, Justice Powell's
concurring opinion and Justice Rehnquist's dissent will be incorporated
into the analysis.
opinion deciding the case on its merits. This Section is done in hopes of alleviating
confusion by ambitious readers who attempt to research this issue on their own.
158. Jurisdictional Statement, INS v. Chadha, No. 80-1832, app. F (May 1, 1981).
159. The INS refiled its notice of appeal after Congress's motion for rehearing in the
Ninth Circuit was denied. Jurisdictional Statement, INS v. Chadha, No. 80-1832, app. H, I
(May 1, 1981). The House of Representatives and the Senate petitioned for writs of certiorari. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, United States House of Representatives v. INS, No. 80-2170 (1981); Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, United
States Senate v. INS, No. 80-2171 (June 22, 1981). The Supreme Court in response: 1)
granted certiorari to the House of Representatives and the Senate, 2) postponed jurisdictional questions in INS v. Chadha to a hearing on the merits, and 3) consolidated these
cases. INS v. Chadha, 454 U.S. 812 (1981) (consolidating case nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, and
80-2171).
The Supreme Court granted motions to extend oral argument to ninety minutes, INS v.
Chadha, 454 U.S. 1077 (1981), and to allow the Council of Administrative Law of the
Federal Bar Association and the American Bar Association to file amici curiae briefs. INS
v. Chadha, 455 U.S. 903 (1982). The American Bar Association, as amicus curiae, urged
affirmance. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 922 (1983) (brief filed by Antonin Scalia and others).
Chadha was finally argued February 22, 1982, and reargued October 7, 1982. INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Burger, C.J., writing for the court; Powell, J., concurring;
White & Rehnquist, JJ., writing separate dissents).
After oral argument, the Supreme Court issued an opinion restoring the case to the
calendar for reargument. INS. v. Chadha, 458 U.S. 1120 (1982) (over the dissent of Justices
Brennan and Blackmun). The Supreme Court also issued an opinion allowing the Solicitor
General to file a third supplemental brief. INS v. Chadha, 459 U.S. 1097 (1983).
160. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Burger, C.J., writing for the court; Powell, J.,
concurring; White & Rehnquist, JJ., writing separate dissents).
161.
MAJORITY OPINION

I. Facts & procedural history
I1. Challenges to authority
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
B. Severability
C. Standing
D. Alternative Relief
E. Jurisdiction
F. Case or Controversy
G. Political Question
H. Conclusion on authority
II1. Constitutional Arguments Against the
Legislative Veto.
A. Article I - perspective
B. Presentment Clause
C. Bicameralism
IV. Separation of powers
V. Case holding

JUSICE WHE's DISSENT

I. History of the legislative veto
II. Article I - perspective
III. Article I - challenges to majority opinion
A. Presentment Clause
B. Administrative state
C. Consistent with distribution of power
1. History of deportation
2. Argument
IV. Separation of powers
V. Conclusion
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The Supreme Court summarized the facts and procedural history of the
case, expanding on the Ninth Circuit's statements in two instances. First,
the Supreme Court pointed out that the legislative veto, "pursuant to sec1 62
tion 244(c)(2) . . .was not treated as an Art[icle] I legislative act."'
Second, the Supreme Court stated "[i]t is not at all clear whether the
House generally, or Subcommittee Chairman Eilberg in particular, correctly understood the relationship between H. Res. 926 and the Attorney
General's decision to suspend Chadha's deportation.' 1 63 The Supreme
Court relied on legislative history to support this proposition. Referencing a similar resolution introduced in 1974, the Supreme Court noted that
when asked whether the resolution disapproving suspension was contrary
164
to the Attorney General's action, Representative Eilberg answered no.
The Supreme Court concluded that use of the legislative veto "in no way
constitute[d] a confirmation of what the Attorney General intend[ed] to
165
do."
1.

Challenges to Supreme Court Authority

The Supreme Court then considered eight independent challenges to
its authority. 16 6 First, Congress argued that the Supreme Court lacked
168
jurisdiction. 1 67 Relying on Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. Roper,
Congress argued that the INS could not appeal to the Supreme Court
because by the time the Ninth Circuit granted relief, it was no longer
aggrieved. 169 The Supreme Court, however, took jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1252.170 The Supreme Court explained that the INS qualified as
"any party" within the meaning of section 1252 because the Ninth Circuit
171
decision prohibited its action.
Second, Congress reasserted its Ninth Circuit argument that section
244(c)(2) was a nonseverable provision of the act and if held unconstitutional the entire act must fall. 172 Justices Rehnquist and White, dissenting, agreed that Congress did not intend section 244(c)(2) to be
severable. 173 Justice Rehnquist noted that Congress had a long history of
162. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 927. Article I legislative acts require bicameralism and presentment. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court states "[the resolution] was not submitted to the Senate." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 927-28. But see supra notes
66, 77-78 and accompanying text.
163.. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 927 n.3.
164. Id. (citing H.R. Res. 1518, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); 120 CONG. REc. 41412
(1974)) (emphasis added).
165. Id. (quoting 120 CoNG. REc. 41412 (1974)).
166. Id. at 929.
167. See supra note 100 and accompanying text (Ninth Circuit argument).
168. 445 U.S. 326 (1980). The Roper Court stated that "[a] party who receives all that
he has sought generally is not aggrieved by the judgment affording the relief and cannot
appeal from it." Id. at 333 (citation omitted).
169. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 930.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 930-31.
172. Id. at 931-35.
173. Id. at 979 n.16, 1014-15 (White & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). Justice White read
the "savings clause" in INA section 406 to pertain to "the severability of major parts of the

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

maintaining control over deportation suspension (whether that control
was by private bill, concurrent resolution, or one-House veto) and this
history did not support severability of section 244(c)(2). 174 The Supreme

Court, relying on legislative intent, adopted the reasoning of the Ninth
175

Circuit and rejected the argument.
Third, Congress argued that Chadha lacked standing because he had

suffered no injury in fact. 176 Again, the Supreme Court adopted the
Ninth Circuit position, holding that Chadha had demonstrated injury in
fact. 177 Fourth, Congress then asserted that the case should not be heard
because Chadha had alternative relief available. 178 Congress noted
Chadha's marriage to a United States citizen, making him eligible for
classification as an immediate relative. 179 Additionally, Congress noted
that Chadha may be eligible for relief under the Refugee Act of 1980.180

The Court found these alternative forms of relief speculative and rejected
181
Congress's position.
In its fifth argument, Congress re-alleged that the court of appeals
lacked jurisdiction under INA section 106(a). 182 The Supreme Court
adopted the Ninth Circuit's reasoning and found jurisdiction pursuant to
INA section 106(a). 183 The Supreme Court acknowledged the Third Cir-

cuit's counterargument that "judicial review under § 106(a) would not extend to the constitutionality of § 244(c)(2) because that issue could not
have been tested during the administrative deportation proceedings conducted under § 242(b)."' 1 But the majority opinion rejected this propo-

sition by making clear that no statute was immunized from constitutional
scrutiny by the courts.' 85

In its sixth point, Congress reasserted the argument that the case

lacked adverseness. 186 The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth CirAct from one another, not the divisibility of different provisions within a single section."
Id. at 979 n.16.
174. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1015-16 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). One commentator has
argued that removal of the legislative veto could never render a statute inoperative, since
the statute is operative only when the veto is not exercised. Note, Severability of Legislative Veto Provisions: A Policy Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1182, 1184 (1984).
175. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 931-35; see supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (Ninth
Circuit position).
176. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 935-36.
177. Id. at 936. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text (Ninth Circuit position).
178. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 936.
179. Id. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (Ninth Circuit position).
180. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 936 (citing Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat.
102). Enacted just prior to the Ninth Circuit decision, the Refugee Act of 1980 provides
asylum to any alien unable to return to his country of origin because of "a well-founded
fear of persecution on account of race." Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. See supra note 72
and accompanying text (ALJ finding of hardship linked to "racial derivation").
181. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 937.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 937-39; see supra note 100 and accompanying text (Ninth Circuit position).
184. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 938 n.11 (citing Dastmalchi v. INS, 660 F.2d 880 (3d Cir.
1981)).
185. Id. at 942 n.13 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
186. Id. at 939.
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cuit's holding of adequate Article III adverseness. 187 The Supreme Court

added that "from the time of Congress' formal intervention.... concrete
adverseness is beyond doubt."' 88 Congress's seventh argument re-alleged a nonjusticiable political question, with a few new twists.' 8 9 The
Supreme Court disagreed, held no political question existed, and challenged whether Congress had chosen a constitutionally permissible
means of implementing its plenary power over aliens.' 9 0
In the eighth, and final argument, the Senate asserted that the case was
nonjusticiable because Chadha's claim was a mere "assault on the legislative authority to enact Section 244(c)(2)."' 191 The Supreme Court dismissed this argument, noting that its adoption would result in every
constitutional challenge of a statute being characterized as a political
question.' 92 Once again relying on Marbury v. Madison,193 the Supreme
Court asserted that the constitutionality of statutes was a decision for the
courts.

194

2. ConstitutionalMerits: The Legislative Veto as a Legislative Act

After favorably resolving all challenges to its authority, the Supreme
Court turned to the constitutional issues presented by the case.' 95 The
Court divided the constitutional issues along two lines: those involving

Article I and those generally dealing with separation of powers. Prior to
laying the foundation for the Article I challenges, the Court explicitly
stated that its inquiry revolved around the constitutionality, not the wis196
dom, of the statute.

The Court defined the boundaries of the dispute as within: (1) the bicameral requirements of Article I, Section 1; (2) Article I, Section 7,
clause 2; and (3) the Presentment Clauses of Article I, Section 7, clauses 2
and 3.197 Relying on the Framers' intent, the Court held that these provisions were an integral part of the constitutionally designed separation of

powers and could not be set aside merely to promote efficiency or con187. Id.; see supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text (Ninth Circuit position).
188. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 939.
189. Id at 940-43.
190. Id. at 940-41; see supra notes 118-23 and accompanying text (Ninth Circuit
position).
191. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 941 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 48, in No. 80-2170).
192. Id.
193. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
194. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 942 n.13.
195. Id. at 943-44.
196. Id at 944.
197. Id. at 945-46. See supranote 13 (quoting text of the Constitution). Justice Powell,
concurring in the judgment, wrote that in basing their opinion on requirements for bicameralism and presentment, the majority invalidated all legislative vetoes. Chadha, 462 U.S.
at 959-60. Justice White, dissenting, noted that this holding "sounds the death knell for
nearly 200 other statutory provisions" containing legislative vetoes. Id. at 967. Justice
White, in the interest of judicial restraint, suggested the case should be decided on more
narrow grounds. Id. Justice Powell postulated this could be achieved by characterizing the
legislative veto as a judicial function. Id. at 960.
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venience. 198 In his dissent, Justice White wrote that the legislative veto
conformed to the spirit, if not the letter, of separation of powers because
it "[was] an important if not indispensable political invention that allow[ed] the President and Congress to resolve major constitutional and
policy differences, assure[d] the accountability of independent regulatory
agencies, and preserve[d] Congress' control over lawmaking."' 199 Justice
White drew the majority's attention to previous Supreme Court decisions
recognizing the modern administrative state and noted this was a clear
indication that not all legislative acts must be passed in accordance with
Article 1.200 Justice White wrote that the legislative veto was a balancing
tool required by Congress to check the sheer size and responsibility of
20 1
rule making and regulation by the administrative state.
In support of the Presentment Clauses, the Supreme Court relied on
the Framers' intent to hold that the presidential veto power was a carefully crafted device designed to protect the Executive from congressional
overreaching and the people from bad laws. 20 2 Noting that the bicameral
requirements were interdependent with the Presentment Clauses, the
Supreme Court used the Framers' intent to show that the dominant nature of the legislative branch required that "the legislative power ... be
exercised in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively consid'20 3
ered, procedure.
The Supreme Court held that the challenged action, the legislative veto
under section 244(c)(2), was legislative in nature. 2°4 The Court confirmed this position by comparing the challenged action to the character
of the action it supplanted. 2 05 Congress agreed, in the alternative, that
the legislative veto either amended or supplemented the Attorney Gen20 6
eral's report, or repealed the application of section 244 to Chadha.
The Supreme Court found this argument unpersuasive, noting that
198. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944-46. "There is no support in the Constitution or decisions
of this Court for the proposition that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in
complying with explicit Constitutional standards may be avoided." Id. at 959 (citing
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)).
199. Id. at 945, 972-73.
200. Id. at 984-87 (citing FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952)). Congress was
required to establish a "prescribed standard" when delegating congressional authority to
regulatory and executive agencies. United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee R.R. Co., 282
U.S. 311, 324 (1931). As long as the entity receiving the delegated powers had to conform
to an "intelligible principle," the delegation was constitutionally permissible. J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). "Intelligible principles" surviving
judicial scrutiny are those which are "just and reasonable" or within the public interest,
convenience, or necessity. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 985.
201. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 985.
202. Id. at 947-48 (citing records from the Federal Convention of 1787, THE FEDERALisT Nos. 51 & 73, and various other sources); see also Geoffrey S. Stewart, Note, 13 HARV.
J. ON LEGis. 593, 609-11 (1976). But see 462 U.S. at 981 (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting
a modest role for the Presentment Clause).
203. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 948-51.

204. Id. at 952.
205. Id. Absent the legislative veto, Article I legislation is the only mechanism Con-

gress may use to alter the legal rights, duties, and relations of others. Id.
206. Id. at 952-54.
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amendment or repeal of statutes must conform with Article I require20 7
ments of bicameralism and presentment.
The House of Representatives argued that section 244(c)(2) met the
requirements of bicameralism and presentment when it was enacted and,
therefore, when administering the legislative veto these steps need not be
repeated.20 8 Justice White's dissent made a similar argument. White explained that the legislative veto did not create new law, or exist without
specific statutory authorization, therefore it was not subject to bicameralism or presentment. 20 9 The majority disagreed, holding that enactment
of section 244(c)(2) failed to meet constitutional requirements, despite
compliance with bicameralism and presentment, because it modified or
amended Article I and therefore required enactment consistent with Article V.210 The Supreme Court explained that a bill enacted into law after
meeting the requirements of bicameralism and presentment was not immune to a constitutional challenge. 2 11 Thus, the challenge was correctly
2 12
before the Supreme Court for review.
The House of Representatives protested that invalidating section
244(c)(2) sanctioned lawmaking by the attorney general.2 13 Each branch
of government is presumed to act within its own constitutionally delegated sphere. 2 14 The argument then was that when the attorney general,
an officer of the executive branch, administered section 244 he was executing the law, not making it.215 Acts executing the law are not subject to
the bicameral requirements of Article I because these acts are limited by
statutes duly enacted under Article 1.216 Executive acts are checked by
both judicial review and Congress's power to modify or revoke statutory
2 17
authority entirely.
Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion, disagreed with both the majority and Congress. Powell found the legislative veto a judicial act, not an
executive act. 218 The majority agreed that the legislative veto appeared
judicial because it "reviewed" executive action and conceded that "it is
normally up to the courts to decide whether an agency has complied with
its statutory mandate. '2 19 The majority, however, held that characteriz207. Id. at 954.
208. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 958 n.23 (citing Brief for House of Representatives No. 802170 at 40).
209. Id. at 980.
210. Id. at 958. Article V requires Congress to propose constitutional amendments by a
two-thirds vote; ratification or "enactment" of amendments requires support by threefourths of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V.
211. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 942 n.13, 958 n.23.
212. Id. at 942 n.13 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), in support of judicial review).
213. Id. at 953 n.16 (citing Petitioner's Brief No. 80-12170 at 40).
214. Id. at 951-52.
215. Id at 953 n.16.
216. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954 n.16.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 960, 964. This is also the position on which the Ninth Circuit based its
decision.
219. Id. at 956 n.22.
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ing the legislative veto in section 244(c)(2) as judicial in nature would
result in the claim not being justiciable for lack of an Article III case or
controversy. 220 Justice Powell found this argument unpersuasive. Powell
believed that the question presented was not whether Chadha had a justiciable claim but whether Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine. 22 1 He found Congress clearly in violation of the separation of
powers doctrine because it had assumed a function ordinarily entrusted
to the courts. Under 5 U.S.C. § 704, the courts have review of final

agency action. 222 Despite a different approach, Justice Powell reached
the same conclusion as the majority: the legislative veto was unconstitutional because it was not within the authority vested in Congress.
Congress argued that support for the legislative veto was found in its

ability to delegate portions of its power to administrative agencies. 223 In
his dissent, Justice White agreed citing legislative history and presidential
support. 224 The Supreme Court held that Congress made a choice to
delegate its powers to the attorney general, 225 and its choice to deport
Chadha must be enacted in the same fashion: "bicameral passage followed by presentment. '226 The Supreme Court then listed constitutionally permissible means by which Congress can control delegated
227
power.
220. Id. The attorney general's suspension of Chadha's deportation presents no case or
controversy until after Congress exercises the legislative veto. Justice Powell's argument
reasoned that because the legislative action reviewing the attorney general's decision was
adjudicatory the court should stand in the place of Congress. Id. at 960. This logic is
defeated by its result-if Justice Powell's argument had been adopted, Chadha would have
no case.
221. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 965.
222. Id. Justice Powell also noted that Congress, acting as an appellant court in its review of the attorney general's decision, failed to provide Chadha with procedural safeguards, such as the right to counsel or a hearing, which would have been provided in a
court or administrative proceeding. Id. at 965 n.8. This result was possible because there
were no internal checks on Congress's judicial function and there were no political checks
when Congress's decisions affected only one person (Chadha) rather than many. Id. at
966.
223. Id. at 954 (implying that its ability to delegate is the converse of its ability to
reserve).
224. Id. at 969 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White, quoting the Senate Subcommittee
on Separation of Powers, stated "an accommodation was reached years ago on legislative
vetoes exercised by the entire Congress or by one House." Id. at 970 n.5 (quoting S. REP.
No. 549, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969)). Justice White noted that Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson supported the constitutionality of the legislative veto. Id. (referencing General
Counsel of the Departmentof Agriculture, Constitutionalityof Title Iof H.R. Rep. No. 6400,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); Separation of Powers: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 206 (1967)).
225. Whether this choice was a constitutional delegation of power is not considered.
Professor Geoffrey Stone suggests the following possible motivations behind Congress's
choice to delegate authority: (1) Congress may know of a general problem but lacks the
required expertise to solve the problem; (2) Congress might fear creating a solution which
will be quickly outdated; and (3) Congress can effectively avoid political liability for un-

popular decisions made by executive administrative agencies.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 415-16 (2d ed. 1991).

GEOFFREY

R. STONE

ET AL.,

226. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 954.
227. Id. at 955 (limiting original grant of authority; durational limits on authorization;
formal reporting requirements). See Jacob K. Javits & Gary J. Klein, CongressionalOver-
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The Supreme Court turned to the Framers' intent for support of its
Article I position. The Supreme Court noted that the Framers "narrowly
and precisely defined the procedure" for acts of Congress outside the
"prescribed bicameral legislative role.1228 As a result, the Constitution
contained provisions "explicit and unambiguous, by which one House
may act alone with the unreviewable force of law, not subject to the Pres2' 29
ident's veto.

The only clear exception the Supreme Court found to this general rule
was in the case of a proposed constitutional amendment which had
2 30
passed both Houses of Congress with the requisite two-thirds majority.
The Court wrote that with regard to specific internal matters, each House

may act alone, but distinguished this situation because internal matters

merely bind the members of Congress. 23 1 The Court also noted that
where one-House action is provided for, the bicameralism check was substituted by other checks. 232 The Court concluded that exceptions to bicameralism and presentment were "narrow, explicit, and separately
' ' 233
justified" and did not include the "veto provided for in § 244(c)(2).
The section was not authorized by constitutional design and did not comply with the Article I bicameralism and presentment requirements. Justice White disagreed, writing that section 244(c)(2) did conform to the

sight and the Legislative Veto: A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455, 460-62
(1977) (delegation of power does not require Congress to acquiesce).
Justice White, in dissent, outlined substitutes Congress might use for the legislative veto
and their flaws. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 973. Greater specificity in original grants might result
in undesirable action or no action when controversy prevents Congress from reaching an
agreement. Id. Formal reporting requirements are no substitute for actual authority. Id.
Corrective legislation provides a retroactive response. Id.
228. Id. at 955.
229. Id. Four constitutional provisions are directly implicated:
"The House of Representatives shall chose their Speaker and other Officers; and shall
5
have the sole Power of Impeachment." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2,cl.
"The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.... And no Person shall be
convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 3, cl.
6.
"[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 2, cl.
2.
"[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme
Court, and all other Officers of the United States." U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
Additionally, implicit support for this position is found in the constitutional discussion of
the electoral system of presidential election. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, and Amend XII.
These provisions also support the Supreme Court's argument that the constitutionally prescribed one-House acts are not legislative. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956.
230. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956 n.21 (citing Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378
(1798); U.S. CoNsT. art. V). This exception is easily understood when it is remembered
that Congress always has the ability to override a presidential veto if approved by twothirds of each house. See U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 7.
2).
231. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956 n.21 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2, 3 and § 5, cl.
232. Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST Nos. 64, 66, & 75; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 and art. II,
§ 2). One example of a constitutional check substituted for bicameralism can be found in
votes requiring a two-thirds concurrence rather than a simple majority. Id.
233. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 956i
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presentment which ensured approval of the
spirit of bicameralism and
23 4
president and Congress.
In taking its position, the Supreme Court turned away from the
nondelegation doctrine. By confining its analysis to separation of powers,
the Court was blind to the overall result: if Congress is unable to check its
delegations of power, lawmaking-and ultimately accountability-is removed from the legislative branch. The Court forced this result when it
supported the delegation of lawmaking authority to an administrative
agency, but refused to allow Congress to have a say in that delegated
authority. Justice White viewed the legislative veto as a tool to preserve
Congress's lawmaking function; a tool that did not violate Article I or the
separation of powers doctrine. 235 White suggested that if violation of
Article I bicameralism and presentment were a concern, the legislative
veto could assume the role of providing legislative reaction to administrative rulemaking and could be used by the courts as a guide to legislative
intent. 236 This approach was supported by the increased importance of
administrative agencies in the current political system. As noted by Dean
John Ely:
In theory it is the legislature that makes the law and the administrators who apply them. Anyone who has seen Congress in action,
however, [will]know that the actual situation is very nearly upside
down.. . .Courts thus should ensure not only that administrators
directions that do exist [but] also that
follow the legislative policy
2 37
such directions are given.
Nonetheless, the current state of the law is defined by the holding in
Chadha: legislative vetoes are unconstitutional.2 38 Justice White, quoting
Justice Harlan's dissent in Arizona v. California,239 expressed his fear that
the holding in Chadhawould result in "fundamental policy decisions" being made by appointed officials rather than Congress, "the body immediately responsible to the people. ' 240 Justice White's fear was quickly
realized when the Supreme Court wasted no time invalidating legislative
24 1
vetoes applying to the review of administrative decision making.
dissenting). Justice White explained that the president's ap234. Id. at 994 (White, J.,
proval is found in the attorney general's proposal to Congress and both the House of Representatives and the Senate show their approval by not vetoing the attorney general's
proposal. Id.
235. Id. at 978-79.

236. Id. at 975 n.l. This suggestion is analogous to earlier report and wait provisions.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
237. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
131-34 (1980). Dean Ely suggests that the transfer of power from elected members of

Congress to faceless bureaucrats has led to a peaceful revolution. Id.

238. Question whether all legislative vetoes are unconstitutional or only those failing to
meet the Article I requirements for bicameralism and presentment. See infra notes 263-77
and accompanying text.
239. 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
240. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1002-03 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963)).
241. See Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of America, 463
U.S. 1216, 1217 (1983) (summary affirmance of lower court decision invalidating a one-
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White's dissent in these summary affirmances noted that the Supreme
Court was creating a "fourth branch" of government that would be free
from oversight by the other three branches. 242 Congress, responding to
these summary decisions, amended a number of statutes, replacing legis243
lative vetoes with joint resolutions.
This quick response was short-lived. The pragmatic reality that Congress would only selectively delegate its authority absent some control
mechanism resurfaced and history began to quietly repeat itself. Congress continued to put legislative vetoes in bills and presidents continued
to sign them into law. 244 Between the Supreme Court's decision in
Chadha and the end of the 101st Congress on October 28, 1990, over two
hundred new legislative vetoes were enacted.245 In the end, Justice
White's fears and Chadha's threats to congressional control have turned
out to be empty. The nondelegation doctrine, on the other hand, suffered
a severe blow under Chadha.
IV.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
A.

THE NONDELEGATION DoCrRINE

Despite Chadha, the development of the nondelegation doctrine remains an issue. As administrative agencies grow in importance and the
regulations they promulgate grow in number, Congress has moved farther from its constitutionally centered position as law-maker. 246 In returning to the center, Congress must assert the nondelegation doctrine
and then implement effective tools to maintain the constitutional goals of
separation of powers and nondelegation.
The Framers' intent is often cited to support the need for separation of
powers and nondelegation in our constitutional system. Not surprisingly,
many statements in support of nondelegation are made incident to, or can
be read as, supporting separation of powers. 247 The correlation between
the two doctrines is stark: one requires each branch of government to act
presumptively within its constitutionally delegated authority, and the
other requires that no branch give up its constitutionally delegated auHouse veto); United States Senate v. FTC, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983) (affirmed the invalidation
of a two-House veto). Following the decisions in these two cases, observers declared that
the two summary affirmances confirmed that the legislative veto decision in Chadha was
sweeping in nature, invalidating all legislative veto provisions. Note, The Supreme Court,
1982 Term, 97 HARV. L. REV. 174, 191 (1983).
242. Process Gas, 463 U.S. at 1219 (White, J., dissenting).
243. FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 15, at 128.
244. Id.
245. Id. (listing examples from various 1989 statutes).
246. As Congress is removed from the lawmaking process, it is removed from political
accountability. Administrative agencies have no need to be responsive because the bureaucratic nature of their jobs insulates agency personnel from accountability.
247. See Madison, supra note 2. Madison cautioned that "[tihe accumulation of all
powers legislative, executive and judiciary in the same hands ... may justly be pronounced
the very definition of tyranny." It. at 324-26; see also 37 Op. Att'y Gen. 56 (1933), supra
note 22.
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thority to another branch. 248 The nemesis of these two doctrines is the
checks and balances system which requires each branch of government to
function within the sphere of another in limited circumstances. 249 The
competing interests appear to frustrate both the separation of powers and
nondelegation doctrines. The Constitution's Framers feared a concentration of power in the federal government, particularly in the legislative
branch. 250 Thus, it is noted that competing interests are necessary to resist "[t]he hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate
Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power ....

,,251

Some argue that the nondelegation doctrine outlived its usefulness and
has been long dead 252 Lawmaking today is generally accomplished by
Congress articulating goals and broad policy considerations, and administrative agencies making rules or regulations to implement these broad
statements. Some argue that this is not Congress's intended role. Congress must do more than establish goals; it must also specify the obligations needed to realize those objectives. 253 When Congress merely enacts
goals, administrative agencies and courts become the primary law254
makers.

Supporters assert that the nondelegation doctrine maintains its use because it "seeks to safeguard against excessive delegation and misuse or
abuse of delegated law-making power. '255 It also provides the foundation intended by the Framers to return Congress to its lawmaking role.
Evidence of renewed confidence in the doctrine can be found in IndusInstitute.256
trial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
257
This confidence is supported by dicta in Buckley v. Valeo.
248.
249.
250.
51: "In
251.
252.

See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text.
See Madison, supra note 2; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 950 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.").
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
Professor Geoffrey R. Stone, referring to the demise of the nondelegation doc-

trine, states "Panama Refining and Schechter [both decided in 1935] are the only two decisions that have invalidated federal statutes on nondelegation grounds in the nation's
history." STONE, supra note 225, at 416-17 (citing Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
253. DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOuT RESPONSIBILITY 181-85 (1993).
254. Id. at 181-83.
255. City of Detroit v. Detroit Police Officers Ass'n, 294 N.W.2d 68, 110 (Mich. 1980)
(Levin, J., dissenting).
256. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion) (restrictive reading of delegated authority);
(Rehnquist, J., concurring) (concluding that OSHA provisions provide for unconstitutionally delegated legislative powers to executive officials). Id. at 682-88.
257. 424 U.S. 1,119 (1976) (per curiam) ("[T]he Legislative Branch may not exercise
executive authority by retaining the power to appoint those who will execute its laws."); see
also Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 202 (1928) ("[Tjhe legislature cannot engraft executive duties upon a legislative office, since that would be to usurp the power of
appointment by indirection .. "); cf. Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens
for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991) (suggesting that the failure to
delegate executive functions to the executive branch may render a statute
unconstitutional).
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Unfortunately, Chadha'sdeclaration that the legislative veto is unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds required that the nondelegation doctrine be set aside. The Supreme Court, deciding that Congress
could not-through the legislative veto-act in an administrative or law
enforcement manner, failed to take away the delegation of lawmaking
authority that accompanied the veto. Consequently, Congress was no
longer allowed to act in a presumptively executive role, even though the
Executive, with Supreme Court support, could assume all delegated lawmaking authority without restriction. 258
Justice White, in explaining the difficulties with the legislative veto as a
tool to guard against excessive delegation of authority, noted that the
Constitution neither directly authorizes nor prohibits the legislative
veto. 25 9 Debate over its constitutionality divides "scholars, courts, Attorneys General, and the two other branches of the National Government. ''260 The debate, focusing on this constitutional silence, is generally
advanced from either a formal or a functional approach. A formal approach allows the text of the Constitution, as it was originally understood,
to supply clear guidance for most cases. 26 1 A functional approach accounts for changed circumstances and the generality of the Constitution
by requiring courts to identify the controlling constitutional doctrines and
assess whether the arrangement under attack violates those doctrines. 2 62

B.

THE LEGISLATIVE VETO

The legislative veto, like the nondelegation doctrine, is not dead.
Chadha called into question whether the legislative veto could ever withstand a constitutional challenge. 263 Arguing from a formal approach,
many said it was not possible for the legislative veto to conform with
Article I requirements of bicameralism and presentment and therefore it
was doomed. Arguing from a functional approach, others said the legislative veto complied with the spirit, if not the letter, of Article I.
The Senate has renewed. its confidence in both the nondelegation doctrine and the legislative veto. This renewed confidence is displayed in a
bill which provides for review of all regulatory rule-making actions
through the use of a legislative veto. 264 Senator Don Nickles, one of the
258. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
259. Id. at 976.

260. Id. at 976-78 nn.12-14 (compilation of law review articles, cases, and commentary
both favorable and unfavorable to the legislative veto).
261. STONE, supra note 225, at 414-15 (citing Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional
Approaches to Separation-of-PowersQuestions: A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L.

488 (1987)). The majority analysis in Chadha followed a formalist theory.
262. STONE, supra note 225, at 414-15. Justice White's analysis in Chadha followed a
functionalist approach.
263. The question is not whether legislative veto provisions can still be used; this is
undisputed. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 15, at 128 (listing examples of legislative
veto provisions in 1989 statutes).
REV.

264. S.219, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also 1 C.F.R. 305 (Administrative Confer-

ence of the United States urges use of the legislative veto; No. 77-1).
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bill's sponsors, noted in debate that the bill was needed to combat excessive regulation. 26 5 Senator Nickles drew Senate members' attention to
the fact that "the administration on November 14 [1994] published in the
Federal Register that they were reviewing and working on 4,500 rules and
regulations that would be effective for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997...
*"266 Senator Nickles stated further that Senate Bill 219 would give Congress "the right and the responsibility ...to not only review, but to analyze these regulations and to reject those [found] too expensive, reject
those [that] do not make sense. '267 Senator Harry Reid added that the
bill was a "good solution to the problem of excessive bureaucratic
268
regulation.
Senate Bill 219 requires government agencies to submit new rules to
Congress, and provides a forty-five day review period. 269 If the new rules
are not approved, Congress may enact a joint resolution of disapproval. 270 The president then has the right to veto the joint resolution of
disapproval. 271 Congress can over-ride this presidential veto by a twothirds vote in each House. 272 The bill's proponents believe these provisions satisfy the concerns of both formalists and functionalists, 273 and will
withstand a constitutional challenge.
Senate Bill 219 was passed on March 29, 1995, "by a recorded vote of
100 yeas," 274 and on March 30, 1995, the bill went to the House of Representatives with a request for a concurrence. 27 5 Senator Levin commented
that passing the legislative veto provided Congress the opportunity to
take responsibility for regulatory lawmaking. 276 Senator Boxer comreasonable response to the probmented that Senate Bill 219 was a 2' "very
77
lem of unreasonable regulations.
This renewed support for both the nondelegation doctrine and the legislative veto is the inevitable result of a government structure that is built
on compromise. Chadha saw the pendulum move away from the
265. 141 CONG. REC. S4686, 4689 (1995).
266. Id.; see also 141 CONG. REC. S4750-51 (Senator Gramm commenting on the addition of 300 pages to the Federal Register by the Clinton administration).
267. 141 CONG. Rc. S4686, 4689 (1995).
268. 141 CONG. REC. S4697 (1995). Senator Reid also commented that bureaucrats had
been laughing at Congress since the Chadha decision. Id.
269. S.219, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103 (1995).
270. Id. at § 104.
271. Id. at § 103.
272. Id.
273. The bill provides for bicameralism and presentment, though not in Article I form.
Some will argue that the bill provides for negative rule-making and Article I authorizes
only positive rule-making. See Chadha,462 U.S. 919 (1983). The bill is functional; it meets
the letter and spirit of Article I without restricting Congress's lawmaking authority.
274. 141 CONG. REC. S4758 (1995) (R 54-0; D 46-0; Vote No. 117).
275. 141 CONG. REc. H3979 (1995). The bill was amended on the House floor by insertion of the text of House Bill 450. The amended bill was passed on May 17, 1995, and sent
to the Senate for concurrence. The Senate refused to concur in the House amendments
and the bill was sent to a conference committee on June 16, 1995.
276. 141 CONG. REC. S4750-51 (1995).
277. Id.
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nondelegation doctrine; now it is merely moving back. Only time will tell
how far the pendulum will swing. Perhaps in the end, there will be a
return to few administrative agencies. Instead, lawmaking power will be
vested in Congress, executive power vested in the president, and judicial
278
power vested in the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment has attempted to answer the following questions:
1.

WHY WAS THE LEGISLATIVE VETO DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL

IN CHADHA?

The legislative veto was declared unconstitutional in Chadha because it
was considered a legislative act which failed to meet the Article I requirements for bicameralism and presentment.
2.

WHAT HAS BEEN THE IMPACT OF CHADHA?

Chadha's initial impact was an increase in litigation which resulted in
the Supreme Court summarily overturning both one-House and twoHouse legislative vetoes. Over time, the promise of Chadha, that all legislative vetoes would be declared unconstitutional and stricken from the
279
over two hundred statutes containing them, has not materialized.
Some individuals speculate that the Court's decision in Chadha merely
drove the "accommodation" between Congress and the Executive underground; Congress no longer uses the legislative veto built into many statutes, but relies instead on informal nonstatutory understandings. 28 0

3.

WILL CONGRESS SIMPLY IGNORE THE DECISION IN CHADHA?

No. When challenged through the judicial system, the holding in
Chadha is used to strike down legislative vetoes. The need for cooperation among branches of government, however, results in reaching political accommodations at the outset and few challenges making it to the
courts.
4.

SHOULD THERE BE STRICT RULES LIMITING CONGRESS IN

DELEGATING ITS LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO OTHERS?

Yes. The need for nondelegation to be strictly enforced is confirmed
by the lack of accountability that results when law-making is removed
from Congress. Regulatory administrative agencies operate outside of
the checks and balances system envisioned by the Constitution's Framers.
Consequently they are not accountable to the people.
278. See U.S. CONST., supra note 1.
279. See STONE, supra note 225, at 431-33.
280. See FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 15, at 126-31.
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5. HAS ENFORCEMENT OF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE BEEN
ABANDONED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT?

No. The nondelegation doctrine was set aside by the expectations imposed on government by the New Deal era and World War II. The need
to delegate authority was a necessary result of the government's more
centralized role and expanded size. The Supreme Court, understanding
the need for compromise in changing times, has not decided a case on
purely nondelegation grounds since the 1930s. As times change, however, we see the Court again embracing the nondelegation doctrine.
6.

WILL THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE BE REVIVED?

Yes. House Bill 219 confirms that nondelegation is on the upswing,
possibly as a result of the need to check regulatory administrative
agencies.
7. IF THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE IS NOT REVIVED, AND IF IT
PROVES IMPOSSIBLE FOR CONGRESS TO SET FORTH CLEAR STANDARDS
TO GOVERN DECISIONS BY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, IS THERE AN
ALTERNATIVE MEANS BY WHICH CONGRESS MIGHT REASSERT ITS
ORIGINAL POSITION AS LAWMAKER?

Yes. Congress can methodically and systematically repeal all delegated
legislative authority. Alternatively, government can be decentralized,
and local and state governments, as well as private institutions, can assume the functions currently performed by administrative agencies.
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FROM THE EDITOR
This issue of the SMU Law Review honors the memory of A. Kenneth
Pye, former president of Southern Methodist University and William
Hawley Atwell Professor of Constitutional Law. The tributes, articles,
and essays comprising this book are the works of President Pye's colleagues-those who knew, worked with, and were inspired by him over
the course of his career. President Pye's distinguished service at SMU
marked the final chapter of an impressive career dedicated to serving the
academic community. Prior to his tenure at SMU, President Pye served
at Duke University as dean and professor of the law school and as president and chancellor of the university. In addition to his many other accomplishments, President Pye was a former president of the Association
of American Law School, a member of the American Bar Association's
House of Delegates, and holder of numerous honorary doctoral degrees.
His untimely passing was a painful loss not only to SMU but to the
broader legal and academic communities as well. Recognizing his many
accomplishments, and in particular his contributions to SMU, the SMU
Law Review dedicates this issue to A. Kenneth Pye.

